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Abstract 
 
Following the terrorist attack in central London on 3rd June 2017, the Prime Minister 
declared, ‘Enough is enough’ in relation to violent extremism. Just 15 days later, 
however, the flag of the proscribed terrorist group, Hizballah, was paraded through 
central London without police intervention. This is because of a loophole by which UK 
legislation proscribes only Hizballah’s military ‘wing’, but not its supposed political 
‘wing’. This article examines the legal background to this situation and argues that the 
current distinction between Hizballah’s supposed ‘wings’ is untenable. If the Home 
Secretary shares the Prime Minister’s view that ‘Enough is enough’, she should now 
move to proscribe Hizballah in its entirety.  
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 Introduction 
On 3rd June 2017, a terrorist attack at London Bridge killed eight and left 48 injured. 
The following day, Theresa May said that there had been ‘far too much tolerance of 
extremism’ in the UK and stated, ‘Enough is enough’ (Walker, 2017). Just two weeks 
later, however, at the annual Al-Quds Day March, the flags of the terrorist group 
Hizballah1 were paraded through central London without police intervention (Harpin, 
2017). This article examines the background to this situation and argues for an urgent 
change in the law.   
 
Introducing Hizballah 
Hizballah, an Iranian-backed Shiite militia group, was established in the early 1980s, 
with the primary aim of driving foreign forces out of Lebanon (BBC, 2016a). Its 
bombing of French and American bases in Beirut in 1983 claimed 299 lives (Levitt, 
2013). It is best known for its hostility towards Israel, culminating in the ruinous 2006 
war (BBC, 2008a). More recently, Hizballah has supported President Assad in Syria’s 
civil war (Chulov, 2013).  
 
Hizballah’s use of the straight-armed salute requires little commentary (StrategyPage, 
2014). Nor does its distinctive militaristic emblem, which features a machine gun 
brandished aloft (Crone and Boyle, 2015). Nor do these ominous 2002 words of its 
leader, Hassan Nasrallah:  
But I’ll tell you. Among the signs […] and signals which guide us, in the Islamic 
prophecies and not only in the Jewish prophecies, is that this State [of Israel] 
will be established, and that the Jews will gather from all parts of the world into 
occupied Palestine, not in order to bring about the anti-Christ and the end of 
the world, but rather that Allah the Glorified and Most High wants to save you 
from having to go to the ends of the world, for they have gathered in one place 
– they have gathered in one place – and there the final and decisive battle will 
take place. (cited in Rosenberg, 2015, emphasis added) 
 
Nasrallah’s words have not prevented Hizballah from actively ‘going to the ends of the 
world’. In the words of Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute, Hizballah has 
established a ‘global footprint’ of terrorist and criminal activity (Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 2013), with a particular focus on Europe (Levitt, 2015a). Importantly, 
however, Hizballah has also participated in parliamentary elections in Lebanon since 
1992 and won 10 seats in the most recent (2009) elections (BBC, 2016a). It holds 
positions within the current government (BBC, 2016b) and also provides social welfare 
within Lebanon (Cammett, 2014). As we shall see, therefore, Hizballah is not 
completely ‘proscribed’ under current UK law. 
 
‘Proscription’ and its consequences: the legislation 
Under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (‘the Act’), ‘terrorism’ has a three-part 
definition. It comprises of the ‘use or threat of action’ involving (among other things) 
‘serious violence’, ‘for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause’ and which is ‘designed to influence the government or an international 
governmental organisation’. Section 1(4)(a) and (d) provide that this definition can 
apply to action which is carried out outside the UK and/or which is designed to 
influence the government of countries other than the UK. 
 
Section 3 of the Act provides that an organisation is proscribed if it is listed in Schedule 
2 - either as originally drafted, or if added to that Schedule by a subsequent order of 
the Secretary of State. 
 
Speaking in 2000, the then Government Minister Charles Clarke explained that 
proscription was to have a symbolic role. It was to act as  
 
‘a powerful signal of the rejection by the Government - and indeed by society 
as a whole - of organisations' claim to legitimacy... It is important for society to 
state that certain activities are simply... beyond the pale... in the sense of the 
way in which civilised, democratic society operates. The legislation is a 
powerful symbol of that censure and is important.’ (Standing Committee D, 
2000) 
 
Section 13(1) of the Act states that  
 
‘A person in a public place commits an offence if he– 
(a) wears an item of clothing, or 
(b) wears, carries or displays an article, 
 
in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that 
he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.’  
 
It is not necessary to prove intention on the part of such a person to arouse the said 
suspicion.  
 Section 13(3) provides that a person guilty of this offence is liable to either a prison 
sentence of up to six months, or a fine, or both.  
 
Under section 121 of the Act, an ‘article’ includes ‘substance and any other thing’. This 
is clearly broad enough to include a flag or banner.  The same section defines ‘public 
place’ as ‘a place to which members of the public have or are permitted to have access’ 
– which plainly includes the streets of London.  
 
Proscription and its consequences: the precedent 
Perhaps surprisingly, there has been only one reported conviction under section 13 
since its enactment. In the 2004 Scottish case of Rankin v Murray [2004] SLT 1164, 
Mr Rankin was convicted of the offence after passing through a port on the West Coast 
of Scotland wearing a ring which prominently displayed the initials ‘UVF’. This had 
prompted police to suspect he was a member or supporter of the proscribed Ulster 
Volunteer Force. The conviction was upheld on appeal, with the court remarking that 
‘[w]hile the manner and circumstances of the offending [were...] at the least serious 
end of the spectrum of conduct against which s. 13 strikes’, it was nevertheless ‘not 
[...] outwith the range of the legislative intent’ (BBC, 2004).2 
 
Application to Hizballah 
On a plain reading of the above provisions, it would clearly be appropriate to proscribe 
Hizballah, as at least some of its activities fall within the definition of ‘terrorism’. 
Equally, and particularly following the case of Rankin v Murray, it would seem to be 
illegal to display the Hizballah flag on the streets of London. If wearing a ring displaying 
the initials ‘UVF’ was at the ‘least serious end of the spectrum of conduct against which 
s. 13 strikes’, carrying the Hizballah flag through the streets of London might appear 
to be at the other end. The latter is not a criminal offence, however, because UK 
legislation does not completely proscribe Hizballah, but currently distinguishes 
between its supposed ‘military’ and ‘political’ wings. We now turn to this distinction.  
 
Hizballah’s ‘wings’ – the current distinction and its rationale 
Hizballah was not included within the original Schedule 2, which comprised solely of 
organisations linked to Northern Ireland. The ‘Hizballah External Security 
Organisation’ was added to the Schedule in 2001. In 2008, this wording was replaced 
by a reference to ‘[t]he military wing of Hizballah, including the Jihad Council and all 
units reporting to it (including the Hizballah External Security Organisation).’ The other 
‘wings’ of Hizballah – its MPs, government ministers and social welfare activities - are 
not proscribed.  
 
Speaking in Parliament in 2001, then Home Secretary Jack Straw said:  
 
‘We are not seeking to proscribe Hezbollah and Hamas generally. Both 
organisations are political movements and, just as Sinn Fein is not proscribed, 
neither are they. We have tried to proscribe—according to one's point of view—
their military or terrorist wings, in this case, the Lebanese Hizballah External 
Security Organisation and the Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades.’ 
(Hansard, 13 March 2001, col 955) 
 
The allusion to Sinn Fein  is significant. The government had proscribed the IRA in the 
original Schedule 2 but it had not proscribed Sinn Fein for fear of undermining the 
Northern Ireland peace process. It seems that similar thinking lay behind the distinction 
between Hizballah’s ‘wings’: a desire to maintain channels of communication with the 
political ‘wing’ and to avoid destabilising Lebanon’s already delicate internal political 
situation.  
 
Tony McNulty, then Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing, said 
the following in Parliament in 2008:  
‘We recognise that the political wing of Hezbollah and the political organisation 
provide a social and humanitarian function in Lebanon. To an established 
extent, they make positive contributions to Lebanon and other places. In 
keeping with a whole range of United Nations Security Council resolutions, they 
provide a positive function in Lebanon and other parts of the middle east [sic]. 
It is to be hoped that the strength of those social and political wings would 
obviate the need for the military wing to do anything in the first place. We cannot 
reach a position in which the United Kingdom and others call on Hezbollah to 
disarm and participate in Lebanese politics as a democratic and peaceful 
political party... and then somehow put obstructions in its way to prevent it from 
doing so’ (Hansard, 15 July 2008, col 211). 
 
A 2009 Government Command paper stated that ‘[t]he UK proscribed the military wing 
as a terrorist organisation in July 2008 but [was] exploring certain contacts at an official 
level with Hizballah’s political wing, including its MPs’ (Home Department, 2009, p. 35, 
paragraph 3.17).  An endnote to the same paper added that ‘This [distinction] means 
that it is a criminal offence to belong to, fundraise and encourage support for the 
military wing of Hizballah however the legitimate political, social and humanitarian role 
Hizballah plays in Lebanon is unaffected by the ban’ (Home Department, 2009, p. 168, 
endnote 53).  
 
The consequences of the distinction 
The consequences of this distinction were clearly seen on 18 June 2017 when, as in 
previous years, Hizballah flags and other articles were paraded through London on Al-
Quds Day. The police did not intervene. Since all ‘wings’ share the emblem, the police 
appear not to see its parading as constituting an offence under section 13 of the Act. 
As Police Minster Nick Hurd MP recently stated: 
‘The flags for the organisation’s military wings are the same as the flags for their 
political wings. Therefore, for it to be an offence for an individual to display the 
flags for these organisations, the context and manner in which the flag is 
displayed must demonstrate that it is specifically in support of the proscribed 
elements of the group.’(cited by Dysch, 2017) 
  
The distinction has therefore created an apparent loophole in the law, whereby it is 
possible to parade the Hizballah flag in public without committing an offence under 
section 13, provided the bearer expresses support for the ‘political’ (rather than the 
proscribed ‘military’) wing. The organisers of the Al-Quds Day March seem to have 
recognised this in their guidance to prospective marchers, which included the following 
words: ‘[Y]ou can bring a Hizbullah flag to show support for the political wing of 
Hizbullah. This is because the political wing of Hizbullah is not a proscribed 
organisation’ (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2017). Some of the marchers even 
affixed stickers expressing support for the political ‘wing’ to their flags (Zionist 
Federation, 2017a) and to other items (Whatsupic, 2017). Yet they also chanted, ‘From 
the river to the sea, Palestine will be free’ – which is generally understood to be a call 
for the military destruction of the state of Israel (Zionist Federation, 2017b). This would 
appear both to undermine any claim that they were supporting Hizballah’s political 
‘wing’ only and, in the words of section 13, to ‘arouse reasonable suspicion’ that they 
were also (or instead) supporting the proscribed military ‘wing’.  
 
Figure 1 
Example of the stickers used to express support for the political wing of Hizballah 
   
 
Arguments against the distinction  
Arguments for maintaining the distinction between the supposed ‘wings’ are not 
persuasive. There is no consistent international approach: whilst some countries (and 
the EU) ban only Hizballah’s political ‘wing’, it is banned entirely in others, including 
the USA (Levitt, 2015b, p. 10; BBC 2013; US Department of State, 2017). If (as per 
the 2009 Command paper) the reason was to facilitate UK government contact with 
Hizballah’s political ‘wing’, there is no compelling reason why complete proscription 
would prevent this: Israel (unsurprisingly) proscribes Hizballah in its entirety but has 
nevertheless sensitively negotiated a number of prisoner exchanges with the group 
(CNN, 2004; BBC, 2008b). In any event, there was no contact between the UK 
Government and Hizballah as late as 2013 (European Scrutiny Committee, 2013, 
paragraph 48.13). If (as per Tony McNulty in 2008) the aim was to encourage 
Hizballah to disarm and wholly embrace democratic politics, this has clearly failed: 
Hizballah has been actively involved in Syria’s civil war (Chulov, 2013) and is 
reportedly preparing for a fresh conflict with Israel (May, 2017).  
 
Moreover, there is no reason in the Act itself why the supposed political ‘wing’ could 
not be proscribed. Under section 3(4) and (5), the Secretary of State can proscribe an 
organisation that s/he believes is ‘concerned in terrorism’ - namely that it commits or 
participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages 
terrorism, or ‘is otherwise concerned in terrorism’ (emphasis added). The last criterion 
could clearly cover a political party or even a charity with financial, organisational, 
symbolic or other links to actual terrorists.3  
 
Most importantly, however - and in contrast to the Sinn Fein/IRA paradigm mentioned 
by Jack Straw in 2001 - Hizballah itself has consistently rejected any notion of separate 
‘wings’. A foundational 1985 document stated,  
 
‘Our military apparatus is not separate from our overall social fabric. Each of us is a 
fighting soldier’ (cited in Levitt, 2015b, p. 13). 
 
In 2000, deputy secretary-general Sheikh Naim Qassem said: 
 
‘If the military wing were separated from the political wing, this would have 
repercussions, and it would reflect on the political scene. But Hezbollah has 
one single leadership, and its name is the Decision-Making Shura Council. It 
manages the political activity, the Jihad activity, the cultural and the social 
activities. . . . Hezbollah’s Secretary General is the head of the Shura Council 
and also the head of the Jihad Council, and this means that we have one 
leadership, with one administration.’ (cited in Levitt, 2015b, p. 14). 
 
In 2002, Muhammad Fannish of Hizballah’s Political Bureau said: ‘no differentiation is 
to be made between the military wing and the political wing of Hezbollah.’ (cited by 
Allyn, 2004). 
 
In 2013, Hezbollah’s Political Affairs Official, Ammar Moussawi said: ‘Everyone is 
aware of the fact that Hezbollah is one body and one entity. Its military and political 
wings are unified’ (NNA, 2013). 
 
Hassan Nasrallah settled the matter beyond doubt with this 2013 statement 
(Nasrallah, 2013): 
 
‘However, jokingly I will say – though I disagree on such separation or division 
- that I suggest that our ministers in the upcoming Lebanese government be 
from the military wing of Hezbollah!’ 
 
In the light of such clear statements, the distinction between the military and other 
‘wings’ maintained in UK legislation seems artificial and untenable. If the purpose of 
proscription is symbolic (as per Charles Clarke in 2001), then Hizballah must be 
proscribed in its entirety. It makes no sense to separate into parts an organisation 
whose own representatives stridently deny that any such separation exists.  
 
Time to abolish the distinction 
We end where we began. It  is unconscionable that just 15 days after the central 
London terror attacks, the flags of a terrorist organisation were paraded through 
nearby streets with impunity. Since 18th June 2017, a number of political figures have 
called upon the Home Secretary to abolish the ‘wings’ distinction and to proscribe 
Hizballah completely. These figures have included Conservative MP Robert Jenrick 
(CFoI, 2017); Labour London Assembly Member Andrew Dismore (Dismore, 2017); 
and the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan (Cohen, 2017). If the Home Secretary shares 
the Prime Minister’s view that ‘Enough is enough’, she must surely now take this step. 
 
ADDENDUM 
On 2nd October 2017, The Jewish Chronicle reproduced correspondence between 
Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London, and the Home Secretary, Amber Rudd (Jewish 
Chronicle, 2017).  The Home Secretary rejected a call from Mr Khan to proscribe 
Hizballah in its entirety but did not give a clear reason for this decision. The above 
arguments for the complete proscription of Hizballah therefore remain valid.,  
 
Endnotes 
 
1 The original Arabic term, meaning ‘Party of God’, can also be transliterated as 
‘Hezbollah’ or ‘Hizbullah’. ‘Hizballah’ is used in UK legislation. 
2 Note that as a Scottish case, Rankin v Murray would be persuasive but not binding 
upon courts in other parts of the UK. 
3 Note that sections 4 to 6 of the Act create a procedure for any party to apply to be 
deproscribed, if it feels it has been proscribed wrongfully.  
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